Are We Against Peace?

“Peace” with Kurds? 

For some time, the political agenda in Turkey had centered on whether the parliamentary commission established to seek a solution to the Kurdish question would go to İmralı and visit Abdullah Öcalan to hear from him directly. Reacting to Erdoğan’s silence on the matter, the leader of the fascist MHP, Bahçeli, effectively threw down the gauntlet during his parliamentary speech, declaring, “If necessary, I will go to İmralı with three of my colleagues,” thereby forcing his alliance partner to take a position. And indeed, not long after, Erdoğan found himself compelled to open the way for a visit to Öcalan

Although recent developments have made the rifts within the AKP-MHP alliance more visible, at this stage it is in neither Bahçeli’s nor Erdoğan’s interest to let the alliance fall apart. A strategy of avoiding political attrition can explain Erdoğan’s reluctance pushing Bahçeli to the forefront. As Bahçeli, who has no such concern, attracts the blowback, Erdoğan reaps the benefits of the process while offloading its risks onto his partner; in other words, he enjoys the rose without bearing the thorns. There are clearly disagreements over the method and pace of the process, but this does not mean it is progressing in defiance of Erdoğan. It is evident that Erdoğan is positioning himself with an eye to the widespread public reaction against any move that might legitimize Öcalan.

Driven by the same concern, the main opposition party CHP announced that it would not be included in the delegation that will visit Öcalan. Had it done otherwise, it would have plunged itself into a crisis. Yet now, the AKP–MHP bloc will surely try to make the CHP and Özgür Özel pay the price for this act of spoiling the game. Indeed, the previous leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu promptly released a video in which he not only gave implicit backing to the arrests targeting İmamoğlu, who has been in prison more than a year, but also declared that a visit to Öcalan was necessary. In doing so, Kılıçdaroğlu once again conveyed to the regime that he stood ready for duty. From this point onward, we can expect the CHP to find itself facing new troubles.

Strong criticism came from the DEM Party against the CHP, which had decided not to visit Öcalan. Tuncer Bakırhan, the leder of DEM, stated: “The main opposition party voted against going to İmralı. In the shadow of this historic moment, this was a major shortcoming. This was not what we expected. The CHP’s decision not to appoint a member has wounded and alienated the Kurds. If we are not going to take responsibility now, at a moment when we have the chance to heal a hundred-year-old wound, then when will we? We have taken note, but our expectations remain.”

From the DEM Party’s perspective, the issue is understandable. Öcalan is being treated as a legitimate interlocutor at the state level. His leadership capacity is being strengthened; his words carry weight… Yet looking ahead, a series of serious “buts” come into view. On the one hand, there is a process in which Öcalan takes center stage, but on the other, there remains the inseparably linked question of democratic rights in Turkey and the national rights of the Kurds.

AKP–MHP is systematically curtailing democratic rights. There is a system in which the rule of law has ended and organized criminal networks operate with impunity. The journalists, students, and politicians are filling the prisons. On top of that, there is a political will intending on further tightening the one-man regime and transforming it into a personal sultanate. Under these conditions, is democracy and freedom really going to be provided to the Kurds?

Let’s focus, not on the aspect of the country as a whole, but on the aspect of national and democratic rights of the Kurds. What will the Kurds actually gain as a result of the process led by Öcalan? The AKP–MHP bloc has no protocol, no transparency, not even any real promise! Or is the real concern that the integration of the SDF in Rojava into Damascus will be facilitated through Öcalan? And again, is there a preemptive maneuver in anticipation of a possible regime change in Iran?

Moreover, the DEM Party is refraining from taking an oppositional stance in this process. Öcalan has effectively become the primary determinant of the party’s policies, and his perspective is now clear. His notes from past meetings contain sharp critiques of figures who once played prominent roles, such as Selahattin Demirtaş and Sırrı Süreyya Önder. In notes that surfaced in the press in September, Öcalan stated: “…The issue of ‘we won’t let you become president’ was Selahattin’s and Sırrı’s mistake. There was no need to turn it into a campaign against Edoğan. Nor did they need to confront Erdoğan directly. They should have focused on their democratic alliances, their work, and broadening the front. That didn’t happen. I believe Selahattin recognized his error.”

Looking back at the 2019 local elections, it is clear that Öcalan was hesitant about allying with the CHP. Through Munzur University academic Ali Kemal Özcan, he sent a message to the HDP (The predecessor of the DEM Party) two days before the elections, urging the party to remain neutral. Yet, as is well known, the Kurdish electorate largely supported the CHP candidate Ekrem İmamoğlu against Erdoğan, helping secure his victory.

At present, it appears that the line Öcalan advocates has begun to dominate the DEM Party. Once popular opposition leader Demirtaş,who has been in prison for 9 years, in contrast has become a sidelined figure. While Erdoğan’s personal animus toward Demirtaş is well known, it is also evident that Demirtaş’s historically combative stance is now seen as a “problem.”

The AKP, which has been ruling since 2002, has a range of political agendas, including constitutional changes and a possible third-term presidency for Erdoğan under the new presidential regime. Furthermore, for plans such as placing the CHP under trusteeship or even shutting it down in the wake of the İmamoğlu case, the DEM Party’s tacit or explicit support is required, or at least its silence.

The Kurdish national movement frames the demand for “peace and democracy” itself as a prerequisite whenever left critiques of the process are raised. Presumably, no rational actor would categorically reject the prospect of “peace and democracy.” Yet a comparison between the day Bahçeli initiated the process and the current situation reveals a striking regression in democratic rights and freedoms across Turkey. In a country where organized crime, plunder, and unchecked looting have been allowed to flourish, anticipating the emergence of democracy and human rights under Bahçeli’s leadership requires an almost exceptional degree of optimism.

Why, then, is progress so stagnant? Putting aside foundational national rights, even another important leading figure Ahmet Türk who is so highly lauded by Bahçeli, has not been reinstated in Mardin Municipality, while the trusteeship seizures persist. Despite numerous court rulings, Demirtaş remains behind bars. Many more examples could be cited. It is therefore imperative to underscore with clarity exactly who is obstructing the path to “peace and democracy” today.

Regional Equations

We cannot consider the steps taken by the Turkish regime on the Kurdish issue in isolation from the geopolitics of Syria and the wider region. For the regime, two matters are particularly crucial in shaping the future of the Kurdish question: whether Rojava and the YPG (People’s Protection Units) in Syria can be integrated with the Damascus administration, and Israel’s policies in the Middle East.

Although the agreement signed on March 10 between Mazlum Abdi and Shara represented a step toward completing the Syrian puzzle, debates continue over how the SDF will be integrated into the Syrian army. In discussions held in October 2025, attended by Trump’s Special Envoy to the Middle East Tom Barrack and CENTCOM Commander Brad Cooper, a consensus was reached on integrating the SDF into the army in separate units. At the same time, both Damascus and Turkey categorically oppose the PYD’s demands for autonomy within a federal Syria. On October 1, Erdoğan explicitly stated that they would not remain silent in the face of such a move: “We have utilized all diplomatic channels to both preserve Syria’s territorial integrity and prevent the establishment of a terrorist structure beyond our borders… Should diplomatic efforts remain unanswered, Turkey’s policy and position are clear.” The Erdoğan regime, therefore, is sending mixed signals: on one hand, wielding threats behind the scenes, while on the other, insisting that the integration of the YPG and the Rojava region into Syria’s central administration be completed swiftly.

The primary concern for Turkey’s ruling classes, of course, lies in Israel’s recent moves in the south through the Druze. Israel’s engagement with the Syrian Kurds remains, for now, on a different plane than its relations with the Druze. The United States maintains a direct stake in northern Syria, and under the Trump administration, it seems unrealistic for Washington to take actions that would directly confront Turkey. Nevertheless, a key aspect of the process involves ensuring that developments in Syria are not left to chance or goodwill. Öcalan’s influence over Rojava could potentially be leveraged as a strategic advantage by the Erdoğan regime. Indeed, it had already been indicated that one of the main topics of the parliamentary delegation’s visit to İmralı would be the Syrian and Rojava question. MPs were expected to probe whether Öcalan’s disarmament call would encompass the YPG, and to clarify the precise implications of “democratic integration” in Syria.

The Rojava Question and the Trajectory of the Kurdish National Movement

Finally, it is worth opening the discussion on Rojava, as a recent article in ANF by Fırat Dicle, titled “Rojava: The Last Stop of Socialism, the First Step of Democratic Socialism,” concretely illustrates the ideological framework shaping the Kurdish national movement in recent times. From the outset, the article contains numerous historical inaccuracies and displays a lack of consistency regarding the history of the USSR and Marxism. Addressing each of these in detail would exceed the scope of this text; readers are encouraged to examine it and form their own assessments.

In a letter dated February 27, in which he called on the PKK to lay down arms, Öcalan noted that the organization faced a crisis of meaning following the collapse of the USSR: “The internal collapse of real socialism in the 1990s, combined with the unravelling of identity denial in the country and advances in freedom of expression, led to a vacuum of meaning and excessive repetition within the PKK. Consequently, it had reached the natural end of its lifecycle, necessitating its dissolution.”

This orientation, of course, is by no means a phenomenon of the present day. Following the collapse of the USSR, Öcalan and the Kurdish national movement were heavily influenced by the postmodern identity wave of the 1990s, steering their course toward “radical democracy.” In fact, ideologically little has changed since that time. The historical sins committed in the name of socialism by the USSR, which turned into a state-capitalist entity through Stalinist counter-revolution, and later by Maoist China, are attributed to Marxism by Fırat Dicle. Yet they have refused to abandon either their commitment to the cause or their willingness to risk everything for it. While the movement remains dependent on cooperation with the United States in the region, the feasibility of a socialist experiment in Rojava remains a separate and contested issue. Nevertheless, the Kurdish national movement is unwilling to relinquish this banner. It continues to need leftist references, and even a verbal adherence to Marxism serves its purposes.

Those who need to draw the lessons from this are clear. Today, the Kurdish national movement wields significant influence over the left, including substantial power within trade unions. Consequently, it has much to offer. It would be a mistake for the left to remain silent as ideological principles are distorted through transactional relationships with the movement.

In conclusion:

Are we opposed to peace? Absolutely not! There is nothing more natural than the Kurdish national movement negotiating with the Erdoğan’s regime. However, it is clear that the process is not solely about resolving the Kurdish question. It is directly linked to Erdoğan’s political future and broader regional policies. As revolutionaries, it is equally natural for us to consider the potential cost of this process for Turkey’s working classes as it is to recognize the legitimacy of the Kurdish national movement sitting at the table with its counterparts. We stand firmly in support of the Kurdish people’s demands for peace and democratic rights! Yet this stance does not preclude us from critiquing the steps that representatives of the Kurdish national movement take in the realm of realpolitik.

From an internationalist perspective, our obligation to stand shoulder to shoulder with the oppressed Kurdish people and their representatives in the face of repression does not negate the fact that we pursue a distinct path from the national movement.